We report a single case study of a brain-damaged patient, ER, who showed a remarkably consistent category-specific deficit for living things. His impairment was observed across tasks (naming, definition, matching, drawing from memory, questionnaires), input modalities (visual, verbal, nonverbal auditory), and output modalities (verbal vs. pointing or visual matching responses) as well as for different types of knowledge. Although visual knowledge of living things was severely affected, his category-specific impairment in nonverbal sound recognition is inconsistent with models of category-specific deficits based on pre-semantic visual descriptions. ER's deficit cannot fully be explained by item typicality, word frequency, visual complexity, homomorphy, age of acquisition, value to perceiver, or modality of transaction. Furthermore, in ER, contextual cues were even slightly detrimental for the recognition of animals. ER's naming and recognition errors were constrained by the categorical structure of the knowledge base: In most cases they respected both the second-and first-order superordinates. In particular, ER's knowledge of shared categorical properties related to biological function was almost spared. This result is compatible with the idea that, for living things, shared functional properties and shared perceptual properties are strongly correlated. Feature-based models assuming perceptual vs. functional semantic components cannot account for ER's deficit, since for living things he was impaired on both kinds of features to a similar extent. ER's behaviour is quite consistent with the notion that conceptual knowledge is organised categorically in the brain, with one or several specialised subsystems for biologically related entities. 
The observation of specific semantic memory disorders, i.e., that some patients exhibit a selective loss of knowledge of items from certain categories, for example biological (or living) entities, by comparison with nonbiological (or non-living) objects, has generated a large debate about the internal organisation of the semantic system (see recent reviews, e.g., in Caramazza, 1998; Forde & Humphreys, 1999; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Saffran & Sholl, 1999; Shelton & Caramazza, 1999) .
According to Caramazza and Shelton (1998, p. 1) , most present models reflect the "dominant, reductionist theory of category-specific deficits," which holds that the categorical nature of the deficits is the result of damage to non-categorically organised semantic representations. Indeed, several explanations share the notion that the apparent boundary between biological and nonbiological things should not be taken at face value, but as reflecting a second dimension of stimulus variation correlated with the biological/nonbiological dimension. These explanations can be divided into those that consider the category-specific deficits as artefacts of uncontrolled variables associated with the impaired categories and those that explain the phenomenon as an emergent property of noncategorical attributes of the members of the categories.
According to the artefact view, impairments of the knowledge of biological things result from the confounding of category with other variables, namely word frequency, concept familiarity, and visual complexity (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992) . Closely related to the artefact account is the notion of visually crowded categories (e.g., Damasio, 1990; Gaffan & Heywood, 1993) , put forward by Humphreys, Riddoch and their colleagues (e.g., Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Riddoch, Humphreys, Coltheart, & Funnell, 1988) as well as by other authors (e.g., Sartori & Job, 1988) . Since biological categories such as mammals or edible fruits have a high degree of intracategory visual similarity, a same amount of noise (or visual processing impairment) would affect the recognition of biological objects to a larger extent than the recognition of nonbiological ones. Arguin and colleagues (Arguin, Bub, & Dudek, 1996; Dixon, Bub, & Arguin, 1997 ) developed a similar idea but involving both visual and semantic dimensions.
The second type of explanation, namely the emergent property account of category-specific deficits, assumes that conceptual knowledge and/or the computational and structural properties of semantic categories are organised in such a way that selective damage to a particular brain area will result in a category-like effect even though knowledge is not organised categorically.
For example, according to the sensory-functional theory (henceforth, SFT), introduced by Warrington and McCarthy (1983) and Warrington and Shallice (1984) , category-specific impairments reflect an opposition between sensorial and nonsensorial features. This opposition is related to the notion of distinguishing features, which serve to differentiate items belonging to the same category (e.g., Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997) . Sensorial features (shape, colour, texture, sound, etc.) would tend to differentiate living things from one another (e.g., the feature <has stripes> differentiates tigers from lions), whereas motor and/or associative and functional features would allow one to distinguish among non-biological objects (what they are used for, how they are made, etc.).
Computational variants of the SFT (Farah & McClelland, 1991) have shown how a system in which the ratio of visual to functional features is higher for living than nonliving things exhibits worse performance in naming living things when the visual semantic component is damaged. The evidence provided by fMRI studies (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1999) , showing that areas assumed to be involved in storing information about object form were activated when subjects answered both visual and functional questions about animals, might argue for the interactive nature of the two semantic representations (but see Caramazza, 2000 , for a different view).
The differential diagnostic value of sensorial vs. functional-associative knowledge for living relative to nonliving things has been incorporated both within multiple (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and single semantic system models (e.g., Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys, 1997; Humphreys, Lamonte, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995; Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 1997; Riddoch et al., 1988) . The main difference between multiple vs. single semantic system models is the level at which the sensorial vs. nonsensorial features' opposition takes place, namely, within the semantic system itself, or not. Warrington, McCarthy, and Shallice have argued for both input modality and informational content specificity 1 within the semantic store. By contrast, Humphreys and colleagues reserve the term semantic memory for nonsensorial features and propose access to the amodal semantic memory store to be accomplished via pre-semantic systems that hold modalitycongruent sensorial knowledge.
The Organised Unitary Content Hypothesis, or OUCH, does not introduce such an opposition between modalities (sensorial vs. nonsensorial features); nor does it resort to any artefact explanation (e.g., Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Hillis, Rapp, & Caramazza, 1995; Rapp, Hillis, & Caramazza, 1993) . According to OUCH, although there are no explicit category boundaries within the semantic system, a category-like structure nevertheless emerges because the semantic properties of concepts of a given category tend to cluster together. Indeed, members of a semantic category share many semantic features (e.g., all animals breathe), and some properties of an object tend to be highly intercorrelated (e.g., things that breathe also tend to be made of certain kinds of substance). In addition there are highly specific correlations between distinctive sensorial and functional features of objects, because the action pattern associated with them (e.g., "used for cutting") is determined considerably by their shape (e.g., "has a blade"; see also Capitani, Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Trivelli, 1993; De Renzi & Luchelli, 1994 ). An implication of these assumptions is that the semantic system is not homogeneous but "lumpy": Some regions are densely packed and others are sparse. Since the properties that cluster together will also tend to be damaged together, a lesion affecting a densely occupied region will lead to a category-like impairment, which would not be the case for a lesion affecting a less densely occupied region.
Other accounts of category-specific deficits share with OUCH the assumption that the properties of members of semantic categories tend to cluster together and, therefore, to be damaged together. However, they also assume an interaction with the different weighting of shared and intercorrelated features. According to these models, biological things share many more highly correlated semantic (mainly perceptual) features than nonbiological objects (e.g., Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998) . For example the features <has whiskers> and <has fur> are intercorrelated because they tend to appear in the same basic-level concepts: cats, dogs, tigers, lions, etc., which have fur, also have whiskers. Since many animals present these properties, they are not informative enough to distinguish between alternative items. In contrast, nonbiological objects have proportionally more distinctive properties. McRae, De Sa, and Seidenberg (1997) suggested that this difference between the two categories might reflect constraints on the structure of the two types of objects (geneticevolutionary principles vs. functional, aesthetic, economic, etc.).
Moss, Tyler, and colleagues Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998; Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995; Tyler, Moss, DurrantPeatfield, & Levy, 2000) argued that living and nonliving things differ both in degree and type of correlation among features. As in Devlin et al. (1998) , they assume that living and nonliving things differ in terms of distinctiveness and correla-COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, 2002, 19 (4) 303 CATEGORY-SPECIFIC DEFICIT tion among properties. But, unlike Devlin et al., they propose that, in the case of living things, shared properties concerning biological actions (e.g., eating, walking, growing, etc.) , have a more special status than specific uses (e.g., riding horses, etc.). Moss et al. also claim that shared biological functional properties are densely correlated with other properties, and therefore less vulnerable to damage. Functional information for living and nonliving things is relatively resistant to damage because it is supported by correlations with shared (living) and distinctive (nonliving) sensorial features .
The models based on the reductionist hypothesis refer to features rather than to raw categories and explain category-specific impairments as resulting from noncategorical properties of semantic representations. Several predictions from these models do conflict with the patients' data. For example, there seems to be no systematic relation between modality and category (see discussion, e.g., in nor between severity of damage and nature of the affected category (Garrard, Patterson, Watson, & Hodges, 1998 ; see discussions in Devlin et al., 1998; Moss et al., 1998) . Additionally, there have been reports of patients with living entities deficits but no selective impairment for sensorial features (e.g., Laiacona, Capitani, & Barbarotto, 1997; Lambon Ralph, Howard, Nightingale, & Ellis, 1998; Moss et al., 1998) , as well as patients with poor knowledge of visual information but no disproportionate deficit for living over nonliving things (e.g., Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) .
More generally, all reductionist models fail to predict which categories may be specifically impaired and to explain why very narrow categoryspecific deficits, like birds but not fish, are not observed (cf., Caramazza, 1998) , and "why it is that by far the most prevalent form of category-specific deficit involves the category of living things" (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998, p. 9) .
To be sure, artefact accounts, including those referring to visual complexity, do offer an explanation for the higher incidence of category-specific deficits for biological entities: they assume that these deficits are due to differences in the degree of processing demands, biological categories being supposedly more difficult to process (more "visually crowded," and/or less familiar, etc.). However, artefact explanations cannot account for some attested patterns of impairment, like selective impairment for biological categories in patients displaying intact structural knowledge (e.g., SB, studied by Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993) , and selective impairment for nonbiological items, supposedly easier to process (Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Silveri et al., 1997; Tippett, Glosser, & Farah, 1996; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 . In particular, observations of opposite patterns of category deficits on the same items (Gonnerman et al., 1997; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991) strongly reinforce the notion that these deficits cannot be due to differences in the degree of processing demand. Some authors have recently proposed that nonliving things may even be harder to process (Laws, 2000; Laws & Neve, 1999; Turnbull & Laws, 2000) . The greater within-item structural diversity of nonliving things (e.g., one telephone may look quite dissimilar to another telephone) implies that more structural information may be needed in order to recognise nonliving than living items, which are more within-item structurally redundant.
In addition, several studies controlling for the effects of numerous variables that were thought to be correlated with the biological/nonbiological dimension (e.g., familiarity, visual complexity, name length and frequency, image agreement, within-category visual similarity, control subjects' performance, etc.) or entering such variables in regression analyses have shown that the "biologicalnonbiological" variable is an important explicative factor in accounting for patients' performance (e.g., Farah, McMullen, & Meyer; Gaffan & Heywood, 1993; Kurbat, 1997; Kurbat & Farah, 1998) .
Thus, category-specific deficits cannot be reduced in a simple way either to a core disorder of sensory or functional-associative semantics per se or to uncontrolled factors. Other propositions, like for example the idea that motor-kinaesthetic integration may be especially relevant for the identification of man-made objects (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987 ; see also Damasio, 1989 Damasio, , 1990 , also seem challenged by the data (e.g., Gaffan & Heywood, 1993) . The available evidence thus undermines any simplistic model in which a single division (e.g., "perceptual vs. functional," "manipulable vs. non-manipulable," or "structurally similar vs. structurally dissimilar") exactly reflects the partition between categories like animals and manufactured objects.
An alternative explanation of category-specific impairments could be that these deficits reflect an underlying organisation in which knowledge about different categories would be represented by different subsystems. According to this category-specific explanation, the impairment of knowledge of biological things is the result of a damage to a subsystem of semantic memory dedicated to "biological" or "living" things.
This explanation was originally proposed by Nielsen (1946) and recently rehabilitated by Caramazza and Shelton (1998; see also Caramazza, 1998) . Evolutionary pressures (e.g., need for nurture, protection, and food, and avoidance of predators) resulted in dedicated neural mechanisms for processing specific kinds of objects like animals and plant life (and also conspecifics, according to Kay & Hanley, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000; Shelton, Fouch, & Caramazza, 1998) . Nonliving things need not be a specific domain knowledge emerging from evolutionary pressures (Barbarotto, Capitani, & Laiacona, 2001; ) for category-specific deficits to occur as a result of brain damage. Such a view is supported, e.g., by concept acquisition studies: The concepts of animal vs. artefact seem to be acquired through the operation of innate domainspecific mechanisms (e.g., Mandler, 1994; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995) .
According to this "domain-specific knowledge hypothesis," there are separate semantic representations for different categories, but there is no separation of features within each category representation: dedicated neural circuits for distinct categories are not committed to the processing of a specific kind of information (but see Coltheart et al., 1998; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999 , for different positions on this matter).
In the present paper, we provide further evidence against the SFT theory and other reductionist accounts of category-specific deficits. We report an 8-year examination of ER, a case of category-specific deficit, who displayed a strong deficit for the naming and recognition of most items belonging to biological categories. First, we show that ER's visual knowledge and visual access to living things visual information were impaired. Then, we demonstrate that his category-specific deficit was not restricted to visual knowledge and that his knowledge of auditory properties was also selectively affected for living things. Third, we provide evidence that the integration of sound, vision and contextual cues did not help ER to access living things semantic information. Finally, we show that ER's deficit for living things comprises functional/ associative attributes as well as sensorial ones, and that his category-specific deficit does not extend to shared properties specifying superordinate categories.
CASE REPORT
ER, a right-handed man born in 1932, suffered a herpes encephalitis in 1969. He was examined at the Neurology Department of Erasmus Hospital (Brussels) in 1985 and in 1986. A CT scan showed bilateral hippocampal lesions with areas of hypodensity in the uncus of both temporal lobes (see Figure 1) . Neurological examination was normal and remained unchanged throughout investigation. Since ER was almost totally unable to recall any event subsequent to the onset of his illness and since he had been abandoned by his family and placed in a psycho-geriatric hospital, no other information relative to his medical history could be obtained. At the end of his professional life, he was working as a computer programmer. ER died in 1996.
ER's IQ score, measured with the WAIS, decreased from 97 in 1986 to 91 in 1991 . ER's comprehension and expressive speech were normal, except for some minor word-finding difficulties. Reading and writing were accomplished without difficulty. When asked to say antonyms and synonyms of words, he obtained 98% and 78% correct responses, respectively. Performance was normal at the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
Memory testing showed a dense amnesic syndrome. ER was severely impaired when he had to recall ongoing events and was disoriented in time and place. However, recall of premorbid autobiographical events seemed accurate and without confabulation. ER's performance was normal for Digit Span but extremely poor for the recall of the Rey figure (3/36) and for the logical memory (3 and 2/ 24) and the paired associate learning (2/30) subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale. The Benton Visual Retention Test was performed at chance level (4/15 on recognition). The Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test revealed screening scores as low as 0 and 1 (out of 12).
ER's ocular examination yielded results within the normal range, considering the age of the patient. Visual acuity was perfect for both eyes; slit lamp examination, pupillary sizes and reflexes, and ocular motility were also normal, as were pattern visual evoked potentials. Colour perception was roughly intact. Normal results were obtained on the Ishiara's (1979) test (one error for each eye). Some errors were observed on the Gelb Goldstein colour sorting test (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941) , but some browns and oranges could not be sorted; beige was classified as pale green, then as white; dark and pale pinks were separated. On the second part of this test, ER correctly sorted the skeins when categories were selected by the examiner. The Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue test (Farnsworth, 1943) was performed in the normal time and led to scores of 96 and 129 for the right and left eye, respectively, without definite confusion zone.
The other visual perceptual abilities were also intact. ER proved to be able to discriminate the individual components of three to five overlapping figures, consisting of either geometric forms or object drawings. Discrimination of unfamiliar faces, through changes of either orientation or expression, was almost perfect. He was able to copy perfectly simple as well as complex drawings of objects (e.g., the Rey figure, Osterrieth, 1944) . Visual discrimination abilities were investigated using the four tasks designed by Humphreys and Riddoch (1984) to evaluate length, size, orientation, and position discrimination. Compared to four matched controls 2 , who obtained on the average 92% correct responses, ranging from 85% to 99%, ER was in the normal range, with 85% correct (95% for length, 85% for size, 75% for orientation, and 85% for position discrimination).
Routine investigation of naming showed some minor difficulties to name real (3-D) artefacts presented either haptically (80% correct naming; but 83% of the unnamed objects were identified as demonstrated by correct usage) or visually (95% correct naming, the function of the unnamed object being correctly identified). However, when presented visually with plastic 3-D representations of fruits and animals, ER only recognised 65% of them. With line drawings, ER recognised 86% of the artefacts, but only 54% of the biological ones. When presented in a further session with the spoken names of the same drawings and asked to give a definition or to describe them, ER obtained 89% correct responses for the artefacts but only 58% for the biological ones. This was most surprising, because ER mentioned that he lived in a farm (and thus knew many animals). Interestingly, ER showed no difficulty with body parts: he pointed on himself 29 out of 30 parts named by the examiner and correctly named his own body parts when touched by the examiner (24 and 30/30 with eyes open vs. closed).
Thus, ER's neuropsychological assessment revealed two main impairments: a severe amnesic syndrome and, apparently, a selective trouble in the recognition of biological items. The following investigation, carried out in 1986, 1988, and 1991 , is concerned with the second point.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION ER's visual knowledge and access to semantic information about living things are impaired
The first set of tests was aimed at determining whether or not ER suffered from a specific impairment for biological objects when presented with visual input. This question was inspected both through drawing and picture naming and through tests that examine visual access to semantic knowledge without requiring a verbal response (worddrawing matching and semantic association of drawings). Structural knowledge of both artefacts and biological things as well as knowledge of visual details of animals were also examined.
Category-specific impairment in visual naming
Naming of standardised line drawings. A set of 151 line drawings taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) ER provided a correct description of the target several times, without being able to name it. For example, the anchor was described as "what you need on a boat, that you throw into the sea to make the boat stop." Since we wanted to assess the importance of ER's semantic rather than lexical access deficit, we also considered a recognition score based on naming and/or description 5 . ER still displayed a strong category effect, with about 36.5% correct recognition for animals, 35% for fruits or vegetables, and 85.5% for artefacts, c 2 (2) =38.91, p < .001.
In order to examine the "category-specific" explanation in more detail, we checked whether ER was impaired for some artefact subcategories. This was not the case: ER's recognition performance was uniformly higher for artefact than for biological subcategories (see Table 1 ). Even the two worst artefact subcategories (musical instruments and toys) were far more successful than the best biological subcategory (mammals). Category specificity was thus quite strong in this patient. Besides, since ER's performance on the animate artefacts (transport means) was very good, we discard the idea that his impairment resulted from a damage to the feature "motility" (e.g., Hillis & Caramazza, 1991) .
The items that ER was consistently unable to recognise were concentrated among the less typical, infrequent, and unfamiliar items 6 . Mean item familiarity and mean word frequency were significantly lower for the items that he did not recognise consistently (2.5 and 29.45, respectively) To better estimate the possible effect of uncontrolled variables on ER's recognition performance, we checked whether the whole set of animals, fruits, and vegetables differed from the artefact items on the 4 mentioned variables as well as on 13 other variables. These are image agreement 7 , similarity to most similar other object 8 , contour overlap 9 , which measures intra-category object visual similarity , age of acquisition 10 , French name length in terms of number of letters and number of syllables, proportion of internal details, and, at both coarse and fine spatial scales, proportion of straight contours, curvature variability, and total number of concavities (Kurbat, 1997) . Averaged values of these material characteristics are presented in Appendix A. ANOVAs were performed on these measures (see Appendix A for the results of the Scheffé's tests), showing that categories differed in terms of image agreement, familiarity, visual complexity, straight contours, curvature variability and total number of concavities at both scales, contour overlap, typicality (p always at least £ .01), similarity to the most similar other object, and proportion of internal details (p at least £ .05). Yet, many of the differences observed between the animal, fruit or vegetable, and artefact items cannot account for ER's pattern of results. They either favour performance on biological items (image agreement, typicality, and proportion of internal details) or are observed between artefacts and one but not the 6 Familiarity was assessed using Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) tables. Oral word frequency was assessed using VikisFreibergs' (1974) tables, and typicality using Dubois' (1982 Dubois' ( , 1983 tables. 7 Assessed using Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) tables.
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other biological category (familiarity, visual complexity, similarity to most similar other object, proportion of internal details, curvature variability at fine scale, and number of concavities at both scales). Nevertheless, four consistent differences are observed: in comparison to artefacts, the animals, fruits, and vegetables categories presented less straight contours at both scales, more curvature variability at coarse scale, and higher intra-category contour overlap. Curved shapes may be more difficult to recognise (e.g., Kosslyn, Hamilton, & Bernstein, 1995) , and greater similarity of the stored structural descriptions among the exemplars of a category may affect discrimination (e.g., . These differences may have contributed to ER's lower score on biological items compared to artefacts. Yet, ER's deficit cannot be fully explained by these uncontrolled variables. Indeed, on a subset of 33 biological and 27 artefact items matched on all the 17 variables mentioned (see Appendix A) 11 , ER still displayed a strong category effect, with, on average, 36% correct recognition for biological items vs. 83% for artefacts, c 2 (1) =11.55, p < .001.
On the same items, Controls obtained 98% and 98.5%, respectively. Thus, as observed in other studies (e.g., Kurbat, 1997) , recognition of biological things remains disproportionately impaired when differences in familiarity, word frequency, typicality, and visual discriminability are neutralised.
By definition, matching procedures eliminate extreme items and may not reflect the natural categories' properties. From the data reported here we can draw the conclusion that, everything else being equal, ER was more impaired on biological items than on artefacts. But questions like, for example, whether the patient would perform as well on frequent, typical biological items as on frequent, typical artefact items, remain open. Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996) suggested that the category effect disappears for very familiar items. We thus checked whether ER would still display the category effect for the most familiar items among the ones that we presented. Like Gainotti and Silveri (1996) , we considered an item as familiar when its rating was greater or equal to 3. This left us with 61 items. Five were discarded in order to match biological items and artefacts for visual complexity. On the remaining 56 items (23 biological ones and 33 artefacts), mean familiarity ratings were 3.5 for biological items and 3.6 for artefacts; mean visual complexity ratings were 2.7 for both categories; image agreement, word frequency, and typicality ratings were, on average, higher for biological items than for artefacts (4 vs. 3.6; 76.3 vs. 63.3; and 37.5 vs. 17.7, respectively) . This should, if anything, have favoured performance on the biological items. Nevertheless, on this set of familiar items ER remained impaired for biological items in comparison to artefacts: he obtained 59% vs. 94% correct recognitions, respectively, c 2 (1) = 8.19, p < .01. Thus, as reported by Gainotti and Silveri (1996) , the category effect may be observed even for highly familiar items.
In a further naming task, we examined whether the category deficit would be observed for highly typical items associated to frequent, early acquired, words. ER was presented with a new set of Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) items matched on visual complexity as well as on two measures of familiarity: one based on frequency of experience and the other, as proposed by Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996) , incorporating both frequency and quality of experience (note, however, that we did not control specifically for differences in visual familiarity, cf. Laws & Neve, 1999) . Quality of experience is a rather loose concept, but we attempted to operationalise it by taking some of the components suggested by Tranel, Logan, Frank, and Damasio (1997) into account. These are "value to perceiver", i.e., how the item is important in everyday life, and characteristic sensory modality of transaction, i.e., how frequently transaction through touch and/or vision and/or hearing was part of the participant's experience with the item.
On the basis of normal subject ratings, we computed a revised familiarity score 12 (see Appendix B). There was no significant difference between biological items and artefacts on this score, suggesting that the material was matched for familiarity even when quality of experience was incorporated in the ratings.
Within this set of items matched for both visual complexity and familiarity, highly typical items associated to frequent, early acquired, words (e.g., rabbit; glove) were contrasted to atypical items associated to rather rare, later acquired, words (e.g., kangaroo; rolling-pin). Average ratings are presented in Appendix B. The test included 34 biological items (23 animals and 11 fruits or vegetables) and 36 artefacts. Within each category half of the items were atypical (mean typicality = 9.15) and corresponded to rare words (frequency 10) and the other half were typical (mean typicality =34.86) and corresponded to frequent words (frequency 20). They were presented to ER and four Controls.
ER's recognition of biological things was once again disproportionately impaired in comparison to artefacts: 41% vs. 94% correct, respectively, c 2 (1) = 20.62, p < .001
13 . In addition, ER tended to perform worse on biological items than on artefacts, even for frequent, typical items. Indeed, for frequent, typical biological items, he performed below the normal range: He obtained 76% correct responses, while controls performed at 94% correct, on average, with a minimum score of 88%. In contrast, his performance on frequent, typical artefacts was perfect. Correct recognition of rare, atypical biological items was virtually absent in ER (6% correct; Controls: 91%, on average, with a minimum of 82%). Rare, atypical artefacts were succeeded at 89% by ER (Controls: 99%, minimum: 94%). Thus, although item frequency and typicality severely affected ER's recognition performance on biological items, the present results show that neither frequency nor typicality of the items can fully account for ER's dissociation between biological items and artefacts.
In short, ER exhibited a specific recognition deficit for biological items in the line drawing naming task. Since this deficit was observed even when the items were matched for familiarity and visual complexity, and even for extremely frequent, typical, and familiar items, it seems that none of these factors can account for the observed dissociation.
Yet, as the naming and recognition performances had been observed thus far on impoverished, standardised line drawings, we also investigated the possibility of a different outcome for more "naturalistic," informationally richer stimuli. This is presented next.
Naming of black-and-white or coloured photographs.
For one test, 120 black-and-white photographs were taken from the Photo Library set (1984): 8 animals, 14 human figures or body parts, 14 manufactured food items, 18 fruits or vegetables, and 66 artefacts. For another test, 55 coloured photographs were taken from magazines: 34 animals and 21 fruits or vegetables. The same materials were presented to 6 Controls.
On black and white photographs, ER's naming of biological items was very poor (50% correct for animals and 39% for fruits or vegetables), with the exception of human figures and body parts, which led to perfect naming. He performed very poorly on food items that are man-made objects of biological origin (29% correct). On the contrary, for artefacts, his score was good (82%). Controls performed on average at 100% correct for animals, 97% for fruits or vegetables (lowest score: 94%), 100% for human items, 94% for food (lowest score: 86%), and 98.5% for artefacts (lowest score: 97%).
The poor scores displayed by ER with blackand-white photographs suggest that perceptual richness of the stimuli did not help him to recognise biological objects. His performance was not better
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with these photographs than with standardised line drawings when we only take into account the 27 items presented in both formats. For biological items he performed at 55% for black-and-white photographs and 65% for line drawings; for artefacts, his recognition performance reached 79% vs. 93%, respectively. This apparently better performance on line drawings is surprising, because photographs offer more detailed information, including information about the objects' surface properties (texture, etc.). It is possible, however, that drawings give more salience to discriminative features.
Colour may be an important surface property for the recognition of some biological things (Price & Humphreys, 1989; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993 ). Yet, ER performed poorly on coloured photographs, with 26% correct naming for animal items and 43% for fruits or vegetables. He made several descriptions that indicate correct recognition, leading to a performance of 41% and 48%, respectively. All the Controls performed at 100%. For the 42 biological items presented in both versions, ER's score was not significantly better for coloured than for uncoloured stimuli: 43% vs. 24% correct, respectively, c 2 (1) = 2.62.
Thus the sole conclusion that we can draw from these two tasks is that the patient's impairment for biological items was observed on all three materials. This is consistent with previous reports on some patients (e.g., Sartori & Job, 1988) .
Error analyses in naming tasks. Since ER's performance on biological items was poor in all the naming tests used, error analyses were performed overall.
We mentioned that, when unable to name an item, ER could sometimes provide a precise description of it. This was the case more for unnamed artefacts (8% of the items) than animals (5%), fruits and vegetables (3%), or food items (0%). Some artefact characteristic might have helped the patient to retrieve the target's semantic information. According to Moss et al.'s (1998) intercorrelational model, distinctive functional properties might play that role for artefacts. If this were the case, for artefacts ER should provide descriptions containing distinctive properties, especially functional ones. This was indeed the case of all the descriptions that ER produced for recognised but unnamed artefacts (see, e.g., the anchor, reported earlier). But the majority (80%) of responses to recognised but unnamed biological items also included salient functional or associative properties, in addition to visual ones. For example, the leek was described visually as an elongated vegetable, about 25 cm long, then was said to be "what you need to make soup." The butterfly was described as "bigger than the bee, it flies, here in Belgium you see it only in the summer, it has wings"; the giraffe as "higher than an elephant; it does not live in Belgium, it has four legs, like a horse." It is worth noting that, if we consider the proportion of unnamed but recognised items among all recognised items, there is no advantage for artefacts: This proportion was 11% for biological items and 10% for artefacts. Nevertheless, correct naming of the target object followed correct description of its function in about 13% of the correctly named artefacts, whereas this never occurred for animals, or for fruits or vegetables, and happened only once for food. This is in agreement with the notion that some functional properties play a crucial, defining role for artefacts.
The intercorrelational model ) also predicts that a patient such as ER would show both better category knowledge and better knowledge of shared properties for biological things than for artefacts. To examine whether some categorical information about biological and/or artefact items was preserved in ER, his incorrect recognition responses were classified into seven error categories. First, we distinguished "no responses," which include "I don't know" and physical descriptions without recognition (e.g., "I don't see what it is; it is elongated") from other response types. Second, among the other erroneous responses, we distinguished misrecognition from nonrecognition. An example of the former is answering "mouse" for the squirrel 14 ; an example of the latter is "an animal." Finally, we examined whether these misrecognition or nonrecognition responses preserved the firstlevel superordinate of the target (an example of misrecognition is the response "mouse" to squirrel; an example of nonrecognition of the eagle is "I don't remember the name of that bird; I think it's bigger than a pigeon"), the second-but not the first-level superordinate (e.g., "rat" for the snail, or "a big animal" for the camel ), or not even the second-level superordinate (e.g., "a footprint" for the potato; or "an object" for the watermelon). Table 2 shows the proportion of these response types. Categorical knowledge seems roughly preserved in ER, with only a minority of responses that did not preserve the second-level superordinate of artefacts, animals, and fruits or vegetables. It was only for food that most of his erroneous responses did not respect the second-level superordinate and made reference to fruits or vegetables (e.g., the cake was reported as being "a fruit or a vegetable," and the sausages as "carrots"), animals (the candy was "a small bird or a cheese") or even to artefacts (the butter was "a cheese or a soap"). Except for these food items, only three responses did not respect the biological vs. nonbiological distinction: the watermelon was identified as an object, the potato as a footprint, and the lettuce as a jumble of clothes. For animals, ER also showed reasonable preservation of knowledge of the first-level superordinate category, with only a minority of responses presenting the wrong first-level superordinate (e.g., the lobster and sea horse were said to be insects). Confusions between fruits, vegetables, flowers, and plants were somewhat more frequent. Overall, the analysis of errors does not suggest better category knowledge for animals and fruits or vegetables than for artefacts: The proportion of responses preserving the first-level superordinate, the second-level one, or neither, did not differ significantly between these three categories, c incorrect responses that consisted in providing only a category name, without any further comment (e.g., the deer: "an animal"; the corn: "a fruit or a vegetable"), we found that about 22% of ER's incorrect recognitions of animals, fruits and vegetables and 10% of the incorrect recognitions of food items were of this type. This never occurred for artefacts.
Most of ER's misrecognition responses suggest that he was aware of his inability to recognise animals, fruits and vegetables precisely. For example, the fox made him "think about a kind of dog"; yet he commented: "a dog, no, I'm not sure it's a dog, it may be a wild animal that resembles a dog." For these categories, nonrecognition responses were clearly more frequent than misrecognitions of animals and fruits or vegetables, which was not the case for food and artefacts. Interestingly, in 7% of the misrecognition and non-recognition errors on biological items, ER referred to the correct target name in his response, but discarded it. For example, for the fly, he answered "a small animal, but I don't think it's a fly and maybe not even a bee"; for the bee: "a small insect, but bigger than the bee"; for the lemon: "A fruit, it has the size of an orange or of a lemon but I don't know its name." This never occurred for artefacts. Animals, fruits, or vegetables misrecognised by ER were often, but not always, physically similar to
KOLINSKY ET AL. the target. Whereas similarity was observed, e.g., for the donkey, which was described as a "small horse," other misrecognised animals were quite different from the target item. The most striking example of this was the response "rat or mouse" provided to the hamster, squirrel, rabbit, and hedgehog, but also to the frog, snail, turtle, seal, and dolphin. A few descriptions included errors about size (e.g., he said the ant to be "bigger than the bee," the eagle to be "of the size of a sparrow, or could it be a blackbird?"; the ladybird to be "a small animal... but it has two big wings, it may be of the size of a small rabbit"). However, even on line drawings, which are standardised in terms of size, the correct size of the animal was mentioned most of the time. Interestingly, one response suggests confusion about auditory properties: The parrot was first said to be "a bird, maybe a little smaller than a pigeon, I can't see what animal it is", but after the examiner asked whether it has some special auditory characteristic, it was described as "maybe a bird that whistles well, it has a special whistle, but it's probably not a canary."
Summary of naming tasks. In naming standardised drawings, black-and-white photographs, and coloured photographs, ER's performance on biological objects was markedly poor in comparison with Controls' performance as well as with his own performance on artefacts. Among the variables examined, none was able to account for these results. ER's deficit was still observed when biological items were matched with artefacts on image agreement, familiarity, number of letters and syllables, oral word frequency, age of acquisition and typicality, as well as on several parameters related to visual complexity. Yet ER's impairment was modulated by some of these variables. In particular, item familiarity and typicality as well as word frequency disproportionately affected ER's recognition performance of biological items. Nevertheless, ER still displayed the category effect for the most familiar items presented. Similarly, in comparison to artefacts, he was still impaired on highly typical biological items corresponding to frequent, early acquired words. Thus, the impact of factors like familiarity, typicality, and word frequency, although significant, cannot fully account for ER's impairment.
As in many previous similar case studies (Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1988; Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1992; Damasio, 1990; De Renzi & Luchelli, 1994; Forde et al., 1997; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Moss, Tyler, & Jennings, 1997; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Swales & Johnson, 1992; Warrington & Shallice, 1984 ), ER's impairment for biological things was not absolute. Indeed, he was able to recognise or name some of the line drawings and pictures of animals, fruits, vegetables, and food items, and, for unrecognised items, he displayed preserved information about superordinate category. Among his errors preserving superordinate information, although non-recognition was more frequent than misrecognition for biological items, the reverse occurred for artefacts. In addition, human figures and body parts yielded perfect scores (e.g., Hart & Gordon, 1992; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Moss et al., 1997) .
Finally, ER's impairment was not limited to lexical access, given that it remained when descriptions suggesting object recognition were taken into account. However, in order to assess more precisely the patient's ability to access semantic information from visual information in the absence of name production requirement, we presented him with word-drawing matching and semantic association tasks.
Impaired visual access to semantic information:
Evidence from word-drawing matching and drawing association tasks Word-drawing matching. Word-drawing matching was examined using the same line drawings as for naming. The stimuli were arranged in arrays of four, and the patient was required to point to the drawing corresponding to a word presented orally by the examiner. Distractors belonged to the same semantic category as the target and were visually as similar as possible to the target (e.g., the target beetle was presented among the fly, ant, and grasshopper). ER scored higher than chance level (25%) on all three categories: he was 95% correct for artefacts, 54% for animals, and 61% for fruits or vegetables, c 2 (1) = 197.12, 23.08, and 15.78, respectively, p £ .001 ). Yet, biological items were matched more poorly than artefacts, c Also, a comparison between a transform of the matching scores that takes chance level into account 15 and the line drawing recognition scores does not show a substantial difference between the two tasks: 67% vs. 59% for matching and recognition, respectively.
Semantic association of drawings. In the Pyramid and Palm Trees Test (Howard & Orchard-Lisle, 1984) , participants are required to match a target drawing with one of two test drawings, using realworld associations. For example, they must choose between a picture of an ashtray and of a saw to match with a cigarette. ER and 4 Controls were presented with 40 triads of biological things, and 40 triads of artefacts (drawings taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) . ER obtained 65% correct responses for biological things, which is not significantly different from chance level (i.e., 50%), c 2 (1) =3.6, p < .10, and 93% for artefacts. We thus again observe a significant dissociation between biological items and artefacts in ER's ability to access semantic information from visual input, c 2 (1) = 7.47, p < .01. Controls performed at 98% (minimum: 95%) and 99% correct, respectively.
Summary of access to semantic information from vision without name production. In the naming tests presented earlier, we suggested that ER's poor scores for biological items did not stem from a lexical access difficulty. Indeed, the category impairment was observed even when descriptions suggesting object recognition were also considered as correct responses. This suggestion is clearly supported by the results just presented. As a matter of fact, in both a word-drawing matching task and a task requiring the match of a target drawing to a realworld associated test drawing, ER still displayed very poor performance for biological items in comparison to artefacts. Moreover, in the latter task, ER was not significantly better than chance for biological items.
Category-specific impairment for the visual description of objects ER was very poor at accessing semantic information from visual input for animals, fruits, vegetables, and food, even when the task did not require naming. One possibility is that he suffered from a deficit of access to the visual description of objects, for example to a structural description system wherein the nature and the spatial relations between the parts and the objects are specified (e.g., Humphreys, Price, & Riddoch, 1999; . Several authors have reported that patients showing a category-specific deficit for living things were unable to distinguish between real and unreal animals or to decide which disembodied part goes with a body with missing parts (e.g., Sartori & Job, 1988) . This type of performance has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a severe deficit for visual properties of objects. However, not all cases of category-specific deficit are impaired in such tasks (e.g., Laiacona et al., 1997; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993) .
In order to assess the nature of ER's knowledge of the visual-including structural-properties of objects, he was presented with tests of object decision, knowledge of animals' details, drawing, and colour knowledge.
Object decision. This test was inspired by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) . Half of the drawings presented real objects (half of them biological-all animals-and half artefacts) and the other half chimaeric objects constructed from the same drawings (all taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart's, 1980, set) . All the chimaeric stimuli were structur-ally probable: They were constructed from two meaningful parts of two different real objects (e.g., combining the head and body of a sparrow with the tail of a beetle, or the reverse), and combinations respected the biological vs. artifact distinction. The test was presented twice to ER, once with 80 items, and once with 52 items. Stimuli were presented in randomised order. ER was asked to sort the stimuli as corresponding or not to a real object. He was informed that some of the stimuli were chimaeric ones. Six Controls did the same task. ER clearly performed above chance level (50%) only for artefacts, with an average score of 88% correct, c 2 (1) =39.76, p < .001. This performance was somewhat lower than that of the Controls, which was 96% correct on average (lowest score: 92.5%). For biological items, ER only tended to perform above chance level, averaging 62% correct, c 2 (1) = 3.76, p = .06, while Controls performed at 99% (lowest score: 95%). ER's performance was significantly lower for biological items than for artefacts, c 2 (1) = 11.33, p < .001.
A closer look at ER's responses shows that 44% of the biological chimaeric objects were accepted as real ones. For example, a gorilla with the head of the rabbit was considered to be an existing animal. This type of error was less frequent for the chimaeric artefacts (15%), and rare in Controls (2.5% and 8% of the biological and artefact chimaeric stimuli, respectively). In ER such errors occurred even for biological items presenting a part of an animal that was well recognised in the naming and worddrawing matching tests (e.g., the cat and the horse, when their bodies were combined with hen and elephant heads, respectively). Thus, for ER, a part of a well-known animal seems to act as an attractor that prevents him from rejecting the whole item. It is even more striking that ER rejected incorrectly 32% of the real biological objects, whereas this occurred in only 9% of the real artefacts, and never in Controls. His commentaries while rejecting these stimuli reflect a severe loss of the knowledge of the visual properties of biological things: for example, he rejected the frog "because it lacks the tail."
Knowledge of details in animal drawings. This test, also inspired by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) , examined whether ER still knew whether a given animal presents some particular attribute. For example, did he still know that the crocodile has a tail but no horn? If he did, did he also know that its tail is very different from a mammal's one? Twenty line drawings of animals taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) served as target stimuli. The distractors were constructed from each selected line drawing by erasing, adding, or substituting a part. Substitutions and additions were made by blending the target animal with other drawings. On each trial, ER was presented with the target and three distractors. For example, a "normal" crocodile was presented together with a crocodile without tail (part erased), or with a horn (part added), or with a mammal's tail (part substituted). Each target was presented three times in three different blocks of 20 trials and with different distractors in the different blocks (e.g., the added part distractor for the crocodile was once a crocodile with a horn on the head, once with a hump on its back, and once with wings). Positions of the correct alternatives and of the distractor types were randomised between trials. In a first session, ER was presented with the target animal's name auditorily and asked to point to its correct image. In a further session, he was merely asked to point to the correct drawing, without mention of the animal's name. Four Controls were tested with the first procedure.
Performance was low, with 42% correct matching on average (47% when presented with the target animal's name and 37% without mention of the name). Although he was better than chance (25%) in both cases, c 2 (1) =15.02, p < .01 and 4.35, p < .05, ER was clearly impaired in comparison to Controls, who obtained 92.5% correct on average (lowest score: 87%). This is consistent with the results observed in the object-decision task and shows that ER had lost precise visual knowledge of animals.
In ER, the choice of the feature-added distractor was much more frequent (69% of the errors) than the feature-erased (6%) and feature-substituted (25%) alternatives, c 2 (2) = 10.56, p < .01. On the contrary, all the Controls' errors were made on the erased part distractors. One possibility is that ER believed that more detailed representations were more likely to correspond to the target: If an ele-phant has a long trunk, why should not it have a horn above the head, too? He thus preferred a crocodile with a horn to a crocodile without a tail or with a mammal's tail. Yet, this interpretation is not consistent with the fact that in other tests, as well as in everyday life, ER acknowledged his lack of knowledge. Nor is it consistent with the fact that he did not prefer a crocodile with a horn to a "real" (correct) crocodile: Each of these two choices represented about 40% of all responses. A further, although speculative, interpretation is that ER's semantic representations were not (or not only) impoverished, but presented unstable activation. Under this view, the more information was presented, the more confusions occurred; by presenting at the same time all the correct parts of an animal plus another part, added part distractors would induce many such randomly occurring confusions.
Drawing tasks. Several cases of category-specific deficit for biological things also displayed an important impairment in drawing affected category exemplars from memory (e.g., De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Forde et al., 1997; Sartori & Job, 1988; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993) . Two such tests were presented to ER: memory-drawing and drawing completion. To control for any perceptual deficit, ER was first asked to copy 31 pictures, among which were 16 taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) . There were 17 animals, 6 fruits or vegetables, 7 artefacts, and 1 food item. The two memory tests were presented a few days after copy drawing. In memory drawing, ER and one Control were required to draw 15 items that had been presented for copying as well as 15 additional artefacts. In the less demanding drawing completion task (see, e.g., Sartori & Job, 1988) , ER was presented with an incomplete drawing, e.g., of an elephant in which the trunk and the tusks had been erased, or of a mouse without the tail, and he was asked to draw the missing part. This test included 40 incomplete drawings, 20 biological items, and 20 artefacts (original drawings from Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) . Despite the fact that ER spontaneously recognised less than 40% of the biological items, copy was very accurate (see Figure 2) , showing again that there was no perceptual deficit (see Case Report).
In contrast to ER's preserved copying ability, memory drawing was rather poor for biological items (see Figure 3) . Only memory drawings of the cat, the mouse, and the carrot were relatively correct. The others were imprecise, with almost no details and severe form distortions. The drawing of the elephant, an animal well recognised in most of the other tests, does not present the characteristic trunk in place, although later when asked to describe an elephant, ER explicitly mentioned the fact that it presents "a long nose ahead". By contrast, artefacts were well drawn from memory.
The same difficulty emerged in the completion task. As shown in Figure 4 , completion was perfect for artefacts, but for biological items it was either nonexistent (e.g., for the eagle) or very imprecise (e.g., for the duck and the squirrel ). Sometimes, ER completed the drawing only partially. For example, he drew the tusks of the elephant, but not its trunk. The completion score for biological items was about 35%, with higher success for the recognised (44%) than for the unrecognised items (25%).
ER's drawing from memory and drawing completion thus demonstrate once again his inability to recall visual attributes of most biological objects. A striking aspect of his memory drawing is the scarcity of details: he often produced only ill-formed, generic shapes for biological items. When a characteristic feature was recalled (e.g., the elephant's tusks), its spatial relation with the other features was lost.
Colour knowledge. Since colour did not seem to help ER in recognising biological things very effectively (see earlier), we assessed his colour knowledge more precisely, using three different tests. The first, adapted from Lhermitte, Chain, Aron, Leblanc, and Souty (1969) , required him to point out the correctly coloured drawing from a set of four alternatives. It included 23 items; 16 biological (9 animals, and 7 fruits, vegetables, or plants) and 7 nonbiological. Colour knowledge was dramatically impaired for biological items: ER scored 34% correct, not above chance level (i.e., 25%), c 2 (1) < 1. Yet this poor score was due to the fact that his performance was clearly impaired only for animals (5% correct responses), but not for fruits and vegetables, which were recognised as well as nonbiological items (71% correct responses in both cases). For animals, ER's performance was poor even for recognised items; for example, he pointed to the red mouse alternative, but correctly named and described it as "a small animal, smaller than the rat, with a rather long tail, which is caught by the cat." The chosen alternative was rather distant from the target colour (this was also the case, e.g., for the swan-blue-and for the bee-red and green).
The second test was more demanding: ER and six matched Controls were presented with object names and asked to produce a colour name in response to a question (e.g., What colour is the mouse?). There were 21 biological items (11 animals and 10 fruits and vegetables), 7 food items, and 19 artefacts. ER was within the normal range for artefacts, with 79% correct (Controls: 90%, on average; lowest score 75% correct). On contrary, his performance on animals, fruits, or vegetables (19% correct), and food items (43% correct) was clearly below the normal range (on average, 97% correct, lowest score 80%; and 93% correct, lowest score 86%, respectively). Contrary to what was observed in the previous task, in the present, more demanding one, ER displayed very poor scores for both animals and fruits and vegetables (18% and 20% correct, respectively). The difference between animals, fruits or vegetables, and artefacts is significant, c 2 (1) = 12.05, p < .001.
We further checked whether the familiarity of the knowledge being probed could account for this pattern of results. We presented seven normal subjects with a test similar to the one designed by Caramazza and Shelton (1998) : For each item, they were required to answer to several questions including the questions about colour used in the present test, and for each question, they had to rate how confident they were that they knew the answer on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing "just guessing" and 5 representing "extreme confidence"). Average confidence judgments were 4.9, 4.84, and 4.56 for biological items, food items, and artefacts, respectively. Since familiarity of the knowledge addressed by the question does not favour artefacts, ER seems to present a true category effect for colour knowledge.
In a more extensive test, adapted from Beauvois and Saillant (1985) , ER's verbal colour knowledge was examined under two response modes, verbal response vs. visual pointing. In the first test version ER was asked to produce a colour name in response to a question (e.g., What colour is a tangerine?), whereas in the second he was asked to point out a wool with the same hue and saturation as the colour of the object whose name was indicated orally (e.g., Show me what colour a tangerine is). There were 28 questions about biological things (7 animals and 21 fruits, vegetables, or plants), 13 about food, 3 about human items, and 23 about artefacts. Stimuli were divided into two sets, and the verbal test and the two tasks were distributed between two sessions according to an ABBA design. ER's performance was very poor, in particular in visual pointing (for correct pointing vs. verbal responses: 24% vs. 52% for fruits and vegetables, 15% vs. 62% for food, 33% vs. 100% for human items, and 52% vs. 87% for artefacts; but 15% in both tasks for animals). Biological items were more poorly responded to than artefacts in both the verbal, c 2 (1) = 8.7, p < .01, and the visual, c 2 (1) =3.97, p < .05, response modes. For biological items, ER frequently said that he was unable to see or remember their colours. This occurred even for items for which he displayed some knowledge, e.g., about form (the date, which was said to be round), size and category (e.g., the lily of the valley, said to be a small flower). When making colour misidentifications, he frequently expressed doubt. Some errors were impressive: for example, he pointed out the light pink for tangerine and the dark auburn for the pig. With verbal responses, he said that tangerines and grapefruits are green, and that the pig is brown. The poorer scores observed with pointing might have been due to ER's relatively imprecise colour knowledge: several times he pointed to the correct colour category, but chose the incorrect hue and saturation. For example, he chose an azure blue for the sea, and a bright, intense red for the rare steak item. Thus, sometimes ER's preservation of a rough verbal category was hiding his inability at precise visual identification.
As in the former test, we looked at normal subjects' confidence ratings to check whether the familiarity of the knowledge being investigated could account for the pattern of results observed with verbal responses. These ratings were, on the average, 4.74, 4.87, 4.86, and 4.71 for biological items, food items, human items and artefacts, respectively. Thus, again, familiarity with the knowledge addressed by the question does not explain why ER experienced so much difficulty for biological items.
Summary of category-specific deficit for the visual description of objects. The results of this series of tests show that ER had a marked impairment for visual knowledge of biological things compared to artefacts. For biological items, he performed hardly above chance in the object decision task, although his score on artefacts was significantly better. Also, he displayed poor memory drawing and drawing completion performance for biological items. However, copy of drawings was very good, confirming the observation that basic discrimination abilities and geometric figure copying were intact (see Case Report). Finally, we observed a category effect for colour knowledge. The whole pattern of results strongly suggests a category-specific impairment of the structural knowledge of objects. Also, ER's poor knowledge of the colour of biological objects might explain why colour did not significantly help him to recognise coloured photographs in comparison with black-and-white pictures (see earlier).
ER's category-specific deficit is restricted to neither visual input nor visual knowledge

Category-specific deficit with verbal input: Word definition
The names corresponding to the items represented in the line drawings or in the black-and-white photographs used in the naming task were presented for oral definition. The test was run several times between 1986 and 1993 and included 238 words: 54 animals, 28 fruits or vegetables, 128 nonbiological objects, 14 human items, and 14 food items. The same materials were presented to nine Controls. Another set of 70 items matched for visual complexity and familiarity but contrasting on typicality and word frequency was also presented to ER for definition. Responses were scored as correct if they stressed some usual characteristic or specific feature allowing unambiguous identification of the object, according to three independent judges.
On the set of 238 items 16 , ER obtained 34% correct responses for animals and 46% for fruits or vegetables, whereas for artefacts he reached 87%. Controls performed at 97%, 95% and 97% (lowest scores 89%, 89%, and 95%, respectively). Thus, as in naming, ER showed a striking dissociation between biological items and artefacts, c 2 (2) = 55.44, p < .001. Also in naming, his performance on human items was perfect; but, unlike naming, he performed perfectly on food items. Thus, in contrast to animals, fruits, and vegetables, it seems that ER's deficit for manufactured food items stems in large part from some anomaly in activating the corresponding knowledge from their images.
ER's deficit for animals, fruits, and vegetables was also observed on the set of biological items (41% correct) and artefacts (86% correct) matched for visual complexity and familiarity, c 2 (1) =13.48,
17 . In addition, ER performed below the normal range not only on rare atypical biological items (12% correct) but also on frequent typical ones (71%). (For Controls, 91% and 94%; lowest scores 82% and 88%. In contrast, for artefacts he was perfect on frequent items and performed at 72% on rare ones.
Regardless of definition accuracy, we examined whether the attributes correctly reported by ER tapped sensorial or associative/functional knowledge. For biological items, ER mentioned about half of each type of attribute (48% and 52%, respectively), whereas on artefacts he reported correctly more functional (84%) than sensorial attributes (16%). Analysis of the correctly defined items supports the view that functional information may be sufficient to specify artefacts to a greater extent than it would be the case for biological items. In about 56% of the correctly defined artefacts ER made reference to only functional or associative characteristics (e.g., scissors: "to cut paper or cloth"). This was the case for only 4% of the correctly defined biological items (e.g., hen: "an animal that you find at the farm, that lays eggs"). The same trend was observed in Controls, although in a less contrasted way: They correctly defined about 16% of the artefacts and 2% of the biological objects only by their function. Superordinates were often mentioned by both ER and Controls, and more frequently for biological items (ER 94%, and Controls 95% of the items) than for artefacts (36% and 67% of the items, respectively). However, for ER, most biological category names were second-level superordinates (e.g., penguin: "an animal…"), which was not the case of artefact category names: On the total number of correct categories mentioned, the proportion of first-level superordinates was 37% for biological items and 97% for artefacts. Controls presented 76% first-level superordinates for either category.
Although ER often acknowledged his difficulties ("I don't remember") and although many of his definitions were vague (as when he produced a second-level superordinate), he also produced confabulatory-like responses. For example, the grapefruit was said to be elongated, the pineapple to look like the banana, the grasshopper to have the same size as the rooster, and the fox as the horse or the donkey, the carrot to be red, and the rabbit to have a long tail. The donkey was the animal that "resembles the most the human being." ER also wondered whether the turtle could have small wings.
Category-specific impairment in nonvisual sensorial knowledge: Knowledge of auditory properties
This series of tests was aimed at assessing whether ER displayed a significant deficit for sensorial properties other than visual ones. We focused on the processing of auditory nonverbal stimuli.
Only a few studies of category-specific impaired patients have investigated sound recognition.
When they did so, some used a verbal input to the auditory property. For example, Sartori and Job (1988) asked their patient Michelangelo questions about animal sounds (e.g., "which is the animal that miaows"? "does the dog bark or neigh?"), and Laws, Evans, Hodges, and McCarthy (1995) asked their patient SE to generate animal names in response to the names of the sounds or to onomatopoeic labels. As far as we know, only five studies concern nonverbal, auditory recognition of objects. Basso et al. (1988) indicate a deficit in a sound-picture matching forced-choice task (11/20 correct) in their patient NV, but the categorical nature of the items was not specified. Similarly, using familiar object sounds (including familiar melodies), Sirigu, Duhamel, and Poncet (1991) found a naming, mimed responses, and picturesound matching impairment in their patient FB, but did not report whether this auditory impairment was category-specific (in other modalities their patient was impaired for the recognition of all classes of objects). Gainotti and Silveri (1996) , also using a sound recognition task with their patient LA, found an impairment for both biological entities and artefacts in spite of the fact that their patient showed poorer performance for biological items in visual and (to a lesser extent) functional knowledge. Hart and Gordon (1992) observed a category effect in oral naming of animal sounds, but this result was observed on only eight animals and eight objects and concerns a patient (KR) showing intact visual structural representations. De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994) reported a trend towards a category-specific sound recognition deficit on a patient (Felicia) displaying impaired visual knowledge of biological things. Using 15 animal and 15 object sounds (e.g., a cow mooing, an alarm clock ringing, etc.), they observed poor scores in the identification of both animal and object sounds and a nonsignificant trend to poorer performance for the animal sounds than for the object ones when the task involved an easier forced-choice response. To our knowledge, there is only one study showing a clear category-specific sound recognition deficit in a patient whose visual structural knowledge of biological things was impaired: Caramazza and Shelton (1998) found that their patient EW, who exhibited a selective deficit for animals, had difficulties both in tasks involving structural descriptions of animals (object and part decision tasks) and in a task of sound identification. Yet, this study did not use any recognition procedure that would take the patient's naming difficulties into account.
It is surprising that sound recognition as well as other nonvisual, nonverbal recognition abilities have attracted so little attention in the domain of category-specific deficits. Sound recognition, in particular, provides a way of testing the inter-modal nature of the patients' deficit: If there were a sensorial subsystem in semantic memory, the comparison of scores on these tests with those on visual tests should tell us whether a further dissociation in terms of sensory modality is needed. In addition, testing of sound recognition also addresses the issue of the explanatory power of damage to visual structural descriptions. The tactile modality does not offer such an opportunity. As a matter of fact, Forde et al. (1997, pp. 448-449) , observing that their patient SRB was affected in naming biological things not only from vision but also from touch, rightly noted that "both visual and tactile identification may depend on access to a common structural description system wherein the nature and spatial relations between the parts and the objects are specified. Damage to this system could affect tactile as well as visual object identification". Whereas this may be true for tactile identification, it seems very unlikely for both identification by taste (which actually was impaired in SRB) and nonverbal auditory identification. Indeed, a "system wherein the nature and spatial relations between the parts and the objects are specified" does not seem to be useful when trying to identify a "miaow"-like sound or a bitter, salty taste. Any observation of category-specific sound or taste recognition impairment thus makes the hypothesis of a damage to structural descriptions rather implausible.
It was thus worth investigating whether a patient like ER, who exhibited a category-specific impairment in the visual modality as well as poor structural knowledge, would display a similar category-specific deficit in auditory nonverbal recognition. We submitted ER to an auditory test of object, animal, and human sound recognition. On each trial, a sound was presented for naming. In case of failure the subject was presented with four drawings, among which he had to point the object that produces that sound. Among the 45 items, there were 12 animal sounds (e.g., sheep, duck, cow, cat, etc.), 7 sounds produced by human beings (e.g., sneezing, laughing, etc.), and 26 sounds produced by artefacts (7 by transport means, e.g., plane; motor bike; 11 indoor sounds, e.g., opening door; hammer; 8 ringing sounds, e.g., ambulance; alarm-clock). The items were blocked according to these six subcategories. In the sound-image matching phase the distractors always belonged to the same subcategory as the target item. The task was also presented to six Controls.
ER's score for correctly matched items on animal sounds (50% correct) was far below Controls' one (100%). It is worth noting that most errors did not involve similar animal sounds, like those made by the goose and the duck, but dissimilar ones, as "cow" for the sheep, the donkey, and the bee. In contrast to this poor performance, ER's score for sounds produced by non-biological objects was significantly better (88.5%); c 2 (1)=4.76, p < .05. Thus, ER displayed a category-specific impairment in the auditory nonverbal modality. Besides, recognition of human sounds was perfect. The same pattern of impairment as the one observed in visual naming and in verbal definition was thus found in the auditory, nonverbal modality. In addition, ER's performance for animals was not better in the present test than in visual recognition or word definition: on the same (11) items, he performed at about 55%, 73%, and 64% correct, respectively. Even animals that were visually recognised, like the sheep and the horse, were not auditorily identified, although the reverse situation never occurred.
In sum, ER's recognition of animal cries was severely impaired, whereas recognition of sounds produced by human beings or by artefacts was preserved. Thus, the same dissociation was observed in the auditory nonverbal modality as in the visual one. This allows one to rule out any explanation based on a sole damage to visual structural knowledge.
Integrating sound, vision, and contextual cues does not help ER to access semantic information about living things
The results reported so far show that ER's deficit was restricted to neither visual input processing nor visual knowledge. Yet, these results were observed on stimuli that do not present the richness of information offered by natural context. For example, a cat had to be recognised from the presentation of either a four-legged static form, or an isolated "miaow." We tried to assess whether providing the patient with both integrated, multi-modal information and contextual cues (movement, interactions, environment, etc.) could help him to identify biological items. With this aim, we presented ER with coloured films of animals displaying their characteristic behaviours, movements, sounds, etc., in their natural environment.
Only a few studies on category-specific impaired patients have investigated the recognition of natural stimuli. Sheridan and Humphreys (1993) presented real food items to SB, a patient showing a category-specific deficit for biological things. The items were presented visually, and the patient was instructed to touch, smell, and taste them. Although the authors observed no improvement of performance in this situation compared to picture recognition, it should be noted that SB was anosmic and had thus little ability to identify food by smell or taste. Only tactile information concerning texture, weight, and shape could have helped her, but this was not the case. More recently, Forde et al. (1997) observed that SRB was much poorer at naming real fruits or vegetables (57% correct) than real artefacts.
Although the real food items used by Sheridan and Humphreys (1993) and Forde et al. (1997) contain much richer information than pictures, they may not convey as much information as animals filmed in their natural environment. Simultaneous presentation of rich, multi-modal, and contextual information may either increase the number of "entries" to the critical information (if there were an access problem) or allow the subject to operate a more systematic scan of the knowledge still available (if there were a representational loss).
For instance, would the animal screaming at other animals, eating a banana, and making athletic jumps from one tree to another be more likely to be identified as a monkey than the same animal represented by means of a decontextualised image or sound?
ER was shown two excerpts, lasting about 1 hour each, of coloured films (Sauvage et beau and La fête sauvage, both directed by F. Rossif ) illustrating animals moving, producing sounds, and interacting with each other and with their natural environment. The first excerpt showed 16 different animals (eagle, elephant, hippopotamus, bear, whale, walrus, goose, crocodile, jaguar, penguin, flamingo, lion, giraffe, zebra, buffalo, and hyena) . The second excerpt showed 32 different animals (e.g., bear, gazelle, hippopotamus, tiger, giraffe, monkey, etc.) . ER was encouraged to take advantage of action, sound, and contextual information to name the animals or comment about them. Sometimes, in an informal way, he was asked to choose between two or three animal names.
In the first film, ER could identify only 1 animal out of 16 (the elephant), and in the second film 3 animals out of 32 (elephant, tiger, and monkey). For the seven animals presented in both films, responses were consistent. On the 40 different animals presented in the two films, his identification score was 6.25%, which is, if anything, even lower than the one obtained on standardised line drawings of animals (36.5%). ER's striking incapacity to recognise animals displaying their characteristic behaviours in their natural environments clearly shows that he was unable to take advantage of either visual information like movements, speed, special postures etc., or nonvisual, auditory inputs. This suggests that either all these types of knowledge about animals were lost, or that they could not be activated anymore, even from highly realistic visual and auditory presentation. Thus, his impairment for biological things was pervasive, at least for visual and auditory information.
The fact that ER was unable to benefit from the contextual cues associated with animals may also suggest that he suffered from a general impairment of semantic knowledge for biological objects involving both sensorial and functional, associative knowledge. This question is examined systematically in the next section.
In addition, there was not only a clear failure to benefit from context, but even a slightly worse performance on richer stimuli. This pattern of results was also observed for the 17 animals that were shown both in the films and via static drawings or photographs (14.7% vs. 33.3%, respectively). A speculative interpretation of this response pattern is that it might reflect unstable semantic activation: When several animals and plants are presented simultaneously, more confusion occurs than when the same items are presented one at a time.
ER's category deficit for living things is not associated to the kind but to the level of impaired attributes
This series of experiments is aimed at dissociating knowledge of visual and nonsensorial (functional, associative, categorical) properties of biological things and artefacts, as well as at investigating more systematically categorical knowledge.
Several models consider that category-like deficits can be reduced to a core disorder of sensory or associative semantics. Perceptual attributes like, for example, shape, colour, texture, sound, etc., would be more crucial for knowledge of biological things, whereas artefacts would be characterised primarily by their motor, associative, and functional attributes (what they are used for, how they are made, etc.), as suggested by Warrington and McCarthy (1983) and Warrington and Shallice (1984) .
Some evidence against this hypothesis has already been reported. For example, it is not obvious how the sensory/functional theory would make sense of some attested patterns of associations and dissociations of category-specific deficits, i.e., of a truly selective deficit for the visual properties of biological things unaccompanied by any degree of impairment for those of nonbiological things , or of a selective deficit for the nonvisual, associative knowledge of biological things (Laws et al., 1995 ; but see Moss et al., 1997) . Caramazza and Shelton (1998) listed additional arguments against the sensory/functional hypothesis. One of these is the difficulty it has in accounting for the selective impairment of either animals or fruits (e.g., Farah & Wallace, 1992; Hart, Berndt, & Caramazza, 1985; Hart & Gordon, 1992 ; but see Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) , or the selective sparing of knowledge for animals (e.g., Hillis & Caramazza, 1991) .
Up to now several studies have shown that knowledge of visual attributes is not necessarily more impaired than knowledge of functional attributes in patients with category-specific deficits for biological things (e.g., Funnell & De Mornay Davies, 1996; Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani, 1993; Laiacona et al., 1997; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998; Samson, Pillon, & De Wilde, 1998; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993) . We checked carefully whether this was also the case for ER, since this provides a crucial argument against the attribute account of category-specific deficits.
Three tests were aimed at dissociating sensorial from nonsensorial knowledge, i.e., associative and functional knowledge, and a fourth test of categorical information was aimed at investigating knowledge of superordinate categories, which appeared to be partially preserved in ER in the visual naming tasks. In order to take the relative difficulty of the sensory/functional features into account, all the tests were also presented to matched Controls.
Sensorial vs. nonsensorial knowledge
Naming upon visual vs. nonsensorial definitions. ER was asked to produce the word corresponding to a definition presented orally. As in Silveri and Gainotti's (1988) study, two types of definitions were used, one using mainly visual information (e.g., for the mouse: What is the rodent mammal which has grey hair, a pointed muzzle and a very long thin pink tail?), and the other to nonsensorial (associative, functional, or metaphorical) information (e.g., What is the rodent mammal that cats like hunting?). The two types of definition were presented for each of 40 objects, 22 biological (18 animals and 4 fruits or vegetables) and 18 nonbiological. The whole set of 80 definitions was divided into two blocks so that each object appeared only once in a block. The two blocks were presented in different sessions. The same material was presented to six Controls.
On average, ER obtained 38.6% of correct responses on biological items (Controls: 92%, lowest score 84%), but 91.7% on artefacts (Controls: 97%, lowest score 91%). The definition type did not affect ER's performance significantly for either biological items, successful at 36% for visual definitions and 41% for functional/associative definitions, or for artefacts, successful at 83% for visual definitions and 100% for functional/associative definitions. ER thus presented a category deficit for both types of definitions, c 2 (1) = 7.12, p < .01, for visual definitions, c 2 (1) = 13.18, p < .001 for functional-associative definitions. Only for biological items did he perform below the normal range in either type of definition. Indeed, for non-sensorial definitions, Controls performed at 95% for biological items (lowest score 86%) and were perfect for artefacts. For sensorial definitions, they performed at 89% for biological items (lowest score 81%) and at 94% for artefacts (lowest score 83%).
Half of the biological items led to consistent responses (three to two correct definitions, and eight to two incorrect-or omission-responses), and half to inconsistent responses. Among the inconsistent responses, six led to correct responses upon the nonsensorial definition but incorrect responses upon the visual definition, and five to the reverse response pattern. Particularly interesting are the nonsensorial definitions that, contrary to their visual counterparts, did not elicit correct naming. For example, the question What is the elongated fruit, not juicy, with a yellow skin? yielded the response "banana" without hesitation, but this response could not be obtained from What is the fruit commercialised by Chiquita, the fruit that monkeys love, the skin of which one should not leave on the pavement because one can slide on it? Similarly, the responses "elephant," "spider," "apple," and "ladybird" could not be obtained from their nonsensorial definition but were elicited correctly by their visual definition.
Sentence verification for visual vs. nonsensorial characteristics.
This test included 84 sentences involving noncategorical objects' characteristics. Half of them were semantically correct, and the other half incorrect. The task was to decide whether each sentence was true or false. Among the 46 sentences concerning biological objects, 26 made reference to a visual characteristic (13 for animals and 13 for fruits or vegetables, e.g., cherries are bigger than prunes; the zebra has black stripes on red ground), and 20 to a nonsensorial (associative, functional, or metaphorical) characteristic (11 for animals and 9 for fruits or vegetables, e.g., the fruits that are used to prepare the wine are plums; lily of the valley is the May day's flower). Among the 38 sentences concerning artefacts, 27 made reference to some visual characteristic (e.g., the fork has three prongs) and 11 to a nonsensorial one (e.g., the train is the fastest public transport). The same material was presented to five Controls.
For biological things ER's performance was no better than chance level (50%) for visual (27% correct) or for nonsensorial (45% correct) characteristics. This was true for both animals (visual characteristics: 15% correct; nonsensorial characteristics 36% correct) and fruits and vegetables (visual characteristics 38% correct; non-sensorial characteristics 56% correct). The sentence characteristic did not affect ER's performance for these biological items, c 2 < 1. He thus performed well below Controls, who on biological items scored on the average 98% correct for visual characteristics (lowest score 93%) and 95% correct for nonsensorial characteristics (lowest score 80%). On the contrary, on artefacts ER performed perfectly for nonsensorial characteristics (as did the Controls), and relatively well for visual ones (85.2% correct; Controls: 98.5%, lowest score 92%), without significant difference between the two types of knowledge, c 2 < 1. Thus, ER showed a category effect for both visual, c 2 (1) = 16.01 p < .001, and nonsensorial, c 2 (1)= 7.13, p < .01, knowledge. ER had lost very common visual and nonsensorial knowledge about biological objects, as suggested, for instance, by his incapacity to respond to The zebra has black stripes on red ground; The colour of the cauliflower is orange; The fruits used to prepare the wine are plums; Tomatoes are used to prepare the spaghetti sauce; The viper's teeth have poison; The animal that frightens Little Red Riding Hood is the tiger.
However, one might argue that, in the present test, different items were used for assessing visual and nonsensorial knowledge. In order to compare these two knowledge types directly, the next experiment presented visual and functional probe questions on the same items.
Cued definitions: Sensorial vs. nonsensorial probe questions. This test, inspired by Warrington (1975) and by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) . All the questions impinging on one particular object were grouped. The same material was presented to six Controls. When ER did not understand a word in the question, this was discarded from the analysis 19 . Among the nonsensorial probe questions, 72 concerned categorical relations of either biological items (26 questions) or artefacts (46 questions), for example, "the pepper is a fruit," or "the kangaroo is a bird." ER performed relatively well: he obtained 81% correct responses for biological items (Controls: 98%, lowest score 96%), and was perfect for artefacts.
For the other nonsensorial probes, ER was very poor for biological items, with about 49% correct responses (Controls: 93%, lowest score 81%). He performed at about the same level (52%) on sensorial probes to biological items (Controls: 92%, lowest score 77%). This pattern of results was observed for both animals (sensorial probes 49% correct; non-sensorial probes 45%) and fruits and vegetables (sensorial probes 58% correct; nonsensorial probes 57%). Thus, as in the former test, ER showed as much deterioration for associative as for sensorial knowledge of biological things. In addition, for at least six biological items, whereas his visual knowledge was still pretty good, rather common nonsensorial knowledge was impaired (this was the case for the bee, butterfly, fly, bear, onion, and cherry). Only two biological items (squirrel and strawberry) yielded the opposite response pattern. On artefacts, his performance was quite good: 89% for nonsensorial probes (Controls: 97%, lowest score 96%), and 86% for sensorial probes (Controls: 97%, lowest score 94%). ER's category effect was thus significant for both nonsensorial and sensorial probe questions, c 2 (1) = 103.99 and 33.36, respectively, p < .001 in both cases.
This category-specific deficit cannot be attributed to a difference in typicality or word frequency between biological and nonbiological items. As a matter of fact, the 54 biological items were matched with the 54 artefacts on typicality and word frequency, as well as on age of acquisition (on average, 18.6 vs. 21.6; 48 vs. 47, and 56.5 vs. 56, respectively, for biological vs. nonbiological items, F always < 1). Since familiarity 20 was slightly but significantly higher for artefacts than for biological items (3.2 vs.
2.5), F(1, 106) =18.21, p < .0001, we checked on a subset of 46 biological and 37 artefact items matched on familiarity (2.66 in both cases) that the biological items were still less well succeeded than artefacts, for both the 391 nonsensorial probes (on average, 51% vs. 86% correct, for biological items and artefacts, respectively) and the 310 sensorial probes (on average, 56% vs. 85% correct, respectively) presented for these items. Thus, even on this
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18 Thirty-five additional questions about metaphorical knowledge are not included in the following analyses, since they concern a very limited set of stimuli: only 7 nonbiological items and 19 biological items.
19 This happened for the word "mammal," which was presented seven times but never understood by ER.
matched subset, ER's category effect was significant for both nonsensorial and sensorial probe questions, c 2 (1) =54.01 and 25.58, respectively, p < .001 in both cases. Moreover, the category-specific deficit can hardly be attributed to a difference in question difficulty level. For perceptual probes, it was possible to check ER's performance on similar questions about size (e.g., elephant: is it bigger than a lion?; accordion: is it bigger than a piano?), colour (e.g., watermelon: is it yellow inside?; piano: does it have white and pink keys?) and global form (e.g., asparagus: has a rounded form; peg-top: has a cylindrical form) of biological and artefact items. When only these questions (120) were taken into account, ER still displayed a category deficit, with 60% correct for biological items vs. 84% for artefacts, c 2 (1) = 7.18, p < .01.
In addition, for the 46 biological and 37 artefact items matched on item familiarity, typicality, word frequency, and age of acquisition, we further checked familiarity of the knowledge being probed 21 . Familiarity of the question did not favour artefacts, for confidence judgements were actually slightly lower for this category than for the questions about biological items (on average, 4.71 vs. 4.8, respectively). Thus, as already observed (e.g., by Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) , the categoryspecific impairment did not emerge as a consequence of the fact that more difficult properties were investigated for biological objects than for artefacts. Neither can familiarity of the question explain why ER was impaired for both sensorial and nonsensorial knowledge. In fact, for biological objects, sensorial and nonsensorial probes tapped equally familiar knowledge (on average, confidence ratings were 4.82 and 4.78, respectively, F < 1).
The whole set of results shows that ER's category-specific deficit cannot be reduced to a core disorder of sensorial (as opposed to associative and functional) knowledge. However, as already mentioned, recent accounts have suggested that the difference between biological and nonbiological categories does not lie in the relative importance of perceptual or functional attributes per se, but in the links between them. For example, Moss et al. (1998) argued that for living things functional and visual properties shared by many members of the category (like laying eggs, having legs, etc.) are highly correlated, in particular those properties that concern biological actions (e.g., eating, walking, growing, etc.). They would therefore be more robust to damage than distinctive properties (like having black-and-white stripes). In contrast, for artefacts there would be relatively few correlations among shared functional and perceptual properties, but strong correlations between pairs of distinctive functional and perceptual attributes.
In order to examine whether this proposition can account for ER's performance, we re-examined his responses by classifying questions according to the fact that they either tapped on shared properties (e.g., for biological items 22 . ER's performance on biological items was better (although not significantly so) for shared than for distinctive properties, with 60% vs. 44% correct, respectively, c 2 (1) = 2.27. This result pattern was not observed with artefacts, on which ER obtained 86% and 88% correct for shared and distinctive properties, respectively. Yet, when only the 94 questions tapping on the same items were taken into account, ER showed exactly the same (although nonsignificant) advantage for shared over distinctive properties for artefacts (85% vs. 79% correct, respectively), c 2 (1) < 1, than for biological items (56% vs. 39% correct, respectively, c 2 (1) = 1.02.
It is worth noting that these 94 questions concerned biological and artefact items that were matched in terms of familiarity, word frequency, and typicality (all F < 1), and that, for normal subjects, familiarity of the knowledge being probed was similar for biological items and artefacts (on the average, confidence ratings were 4.73 and 4.72, respectively). Thus, with material carefully controlled and on questions concerning the same items, ER presented a small, nonsignificant advantage of shared over distinctive properties for both biological and nonbiological items 23 . Interestingly, this was not the case of the Controls, who, on the matched subset of 94 items, performed slightly better for shared than for distinctive properties of biological items (on the average, 98% correct, with a minimum of 94%, and 96%, with a minimum of 89%, respectively), but not of artefacts, which led to 97% correct (minimum: 92%) and 98% correct (minimum: 96%) for shared vs. distinctive properties. In the same vein, the normal subjects' confidence ratings suggest that, for them, questions about shared properties of biological items tap more familiar knowledge than questions about distinctive properties of these items (on the average, 4.72 and 4.71, respectively), while questions about the distinctive properties of artefacts tap more familiar knowledge than questions about the shared properties of these objects (on the average, 4.82 vs. 4.71, respectively) 24 . These results show that ER's pattern of results only partially fits the predictions based on Moss et al.'s (1998) intercorrelational model, since this model would have predicted a significant advantage of shared over distinctive properties for biological items.
For artefacts, the weaker correlational strength of their shared properties should have led to lower scores, but this potential effect could have been masked by the greater frequency of these properties . In any case, Moss et al.'s (1998) model would not predict that a patient like ER should show worse knowledge of shared properties for biological items than for artefacts. Crucially, ER did display this pattern of results. Indeed, he still presented a significant category effect when only shared properties were taken into account: he performed worse on biological than on artefact items, both for the whole set of shared properties, c 2 (1)=4.89, p < .05, and for the smaller set of properties relative to biological and artefact items matched in terms of familiarity, word frequency, and typicality, c 2 (1)= 4.12, p < .05. This living things impairment observed on shared properties is thus at odds with Moss et al.'s (1998) model. Yet, Moss et al. (1998) also proposed that the most preserved information for biological items should be biological actions like "can see," "can move," etc. and their correlated perceptual attributes (has eyes, has legs, etc.). For biological items these properties are most densely correlated with other properties, and therefore should be better preserved than shared properties that do not pertain to their biological function (e.g., can live in a zoo, can be a pet, etc.). Since in the present test most of the shared properties were of the latter type, it remains possible that ER would have shown a far better performance for biological shared properties. This point will be further commented after examining ER's performance in the next test, in which knowledge of categorical information was examined in more detail.
For most visual and functional probes, ER's erroneous responses to biological items were of the type "I do not know/remember." Yet, as in word definition, he also presented many confabulatorylike responses. As examples of such responses to visual characteristics, the crocodile was thought to have fur, as was also the case for the elephant, the frog (which was supposed to have a "hairy skin"), and the rhinoceros (who was said to have "long fur"). The strawberry was thought to be orange, and the rhinoceros and the camel to be multicoloured. ER also said that there are two kinds of lions, white ones and black ones, probably confounding it with the bear, which was thought to have hooves; the snail was believed to have no feelers, and the duck no wings, as he thought it could not fly. The elephant was admitted to have horns "pour sa défense," which means "for its defence" (in French "défense" also means "tusk"!). The ostrich was said to be smaller than a hen, and the rhinoceros smaller than a lion. The giraffe was supposed to have short legs and the deer a long tail. Examples of confabulatory-like responses for nonperceptual characteristics are the following: The lion and the rhinoceros were said to be nondangerous, but the deer to be dangerous "for small animals that it may kill." The penguin was supposed to live in the forest, and the zebra in cold countries; the mushroom was believed to grow in dry places and to be juicy. The frog was supposed to crawl, the snail to move fast, and the duck not to fly.
Knowledge of categorical information: Categorical shared attributes and categorical names
ER's performance in cued definition and in naming suggests that his knowledge of superordinates was relatively spared. ER was quite capable of distinguishing animals from fruits and vegetables and artefacts. Sparing of superordinates has already been described for several category-specific cases, as for other types of semantic impairment (e.g., Alzheimer's disease, see for instance, Tippett et al., 1995) . For example, Michelangelo (Sartori & Job, 1988) was very good at verifying statements about categorical relations, regardless of whether categorical attributes or superordinate names were presented, and regardless of whether first-level superordinates (e.g., "banana-fruit") or secondlevel superordinates (e.g., "banana-vegetable") were used. We adapted such a sentence verification task to examine whether ER had preserved knowledge of both categorical relations and categorical (i.e., shared) attributes.
The test included 64 short French sentences, half semantically correct, the other half incorrect. Half of the sentences concerned categorical relations: they were of the type "X is a Y," with half of the Xs being animals, and half fruits or vegetables. Y was either the name of a first-level superordinate category (e.g., The owl is a bird; The owl is a fish), or the name of a second-level superordinate (e.g., The owl is an animal; The owl is a vegetable). The other sentences concerned categorical attributes: they were of the type "X has Y," using the same X as in the former sentences. Y was an attribute of a firstlevel superordinate category (e.g., The owl has wings; The owl has flippers), or of a second-level superordinate (e.g., The owl has a heart; The owl has roots). These categorical attributes correspond to the correlates of biological shared properties (cf., Moss et al., 1998) . The X were selected according to ER's performance in previous naming, drawing, and definition tests: for half of them (sparrow, mouse, banana, apple), ER's knowledge was roughly intact; for the other half (owl, penguin, pineapple, and pepper), it was severely impaired. Sentences were presented in random order in a tachistoscope. ER was asked to respond whether the sentence was correct/incorrect by pushing/pulling a lever as quickly as possible, without making an error 25 .
Response latency was very long (mean: 2.58 s) and did not show any systematic effect. Nonetheless, ER performed at a high level of accuracy, even if some items had to be discarded from the analysis, since ER did not remember the meaning of some terms used in the questions (e.g., "vegetable"). On the remaining 55 items, he obtained 90% correct responses for categorical relations and 92% correct for categorical attributes (chance level: 50%). As regards categorical relations, incorrect responses were given to the following sentences: pepper is a fruit, banana is part of a plant; rat is a rodent. The errors did not so much concern the items about which ER failed on categorical attribute knowledge but rather those on which he apparently had intact categorical attribute knowledge. As regards categorical attributes, he incorrectly rejected sparrow has a heart, and could not answer to penguin has fins. Errors were equally distributed between items that had been recognised, correctly defined, and/or correctly drawn in previous tests and items of which precise knowledge was severely impaired.
These results confirm that ER has fair knowledge, though not perfect, of categorical relations and categorical attributes of both known and unknown biological items. They fit Moss et al.'s (1998) suggestion that biological shared properties may be better preserved in category-specific impaired patients that other types of properties of biological items. Yet, the familiarity of the knowledge tapped by this type of question seems by itself to account for this pattern of response. Indeed, in normal subjects these questions about categorical knowledge led to significantly higher ratings 26 than those addressing other knowledge types about the same items (on average, 4.97 for categorical relations and 4.93 for categorical attributes vs. 4.85 for the other properties of the same items examined in the cued definition test, F(1, 66)= 3.97, p = .05).
Summary
The results of this series of experiments suggest that the visual vs. nonsensorial, functional/associative nature of the attributes cannot account for the specific deficit of ER for biological objects. In fact, a clear biological vs. nonbiological dissociation remained even when naming followed a nonsensorial definition and when question probes concerned functional/associative knowledge. In no experiment was ER significantly less affected in functional/associative than in visual knowledge, in comparison to Controls.
An additional finding is that, as regards living things, shared properties, at least those related to biological functions, are relatively well preserved.
We will comment further on this point in the General Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have documented here the case of a patient (ER) who displayed a category-specific deficit in recognising biological entities. This impairment occurred across a variety of tasks and modalities, including recognition from vision, verbal definition, naming upon definition, drawing from memory, and nonverbal sound recognition. It can be explained by neither a perceptual deficit nor a lexical access deficit.
ER's deficit was strongly modulated by item typicality and word frequency. Nevertheless, since ER's performance was poorer on frequent and typical biological items than on frequent and typical nonbiological items matched on visual complexity and on familiarity, the impact of those factors is insufficient to account for ER's impairment. This allows us to rule out artefact explanations, including those based on the notion of visually crowded categories (e.g., Gaffan & Heywood, 1993; Humphreys et al., 1995) .
In the following sections, we attempt to summarise the main results of our study and to discuss their implications for understanding the nature of category-specific deficits.
Category specificity: What is lost and what is preserved?
Impaired visual knowledge
In all the visual naming or matching tests as well as in all the verbal tests (naming upon definition, sentence verification, cued definitions) presented to ER, we observed a clear category-specific impairment for visual knowledge. ER's perceptual knowledge of the structure of biological objects was seriously affected. This was attested by poor drawing from memory and drawing completion as well as by a selective impairment for biological objects in tasks that, according to Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) , require access to the structural descriptions of objects.
In addition, there was no evidence that the patient's impairment might stem from perceptual damage to configurational coding, as suggested by . Most of ER's misrecognitions were confusions between animals with similar configurational shapes but differing mainly by some local detail (e.g., the fox for the dog, the zebra for the horse). If the underlying deficit were a general problem with configurational coding, we would hardly understand why ER was good at recognising and drawing from memory some living entities (e.g., the cat).
Impaired functional knowledge ER's impairment was not limited to visual (including structural) knowledge. The visual vs. nonsensorial (functional/associative) nature of the attributes cannot account for the specific deficit of ER for biological objects. The dissociation between living and nonliving things was clear, even when naming followed a nonsensorial definition and when question probes concerned functional/associative knowledge. In no experiment was ER significantly more affected for visual than functional/ associative knowledge of living things. This pattern of results, which had already been reported (Barbarotto, Capitani, Spinnler, & Trivelli, 1995; Funnell & De Mornay Davies, 1996; Laiacona et al., 1993 Laiacona et al., , 1997 Lambon Ralph et al., 1998; Moss et al., 1998; Samson et al., 1998; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993) , shows that ER's category-specific deficit cannot be reduced to a core disorder of sensorial knowledge. It thus argues against sensorial-functional models of organisation of the semantic system.
Preserved categorical knowledge
Although severely impaired in both sensorial and functional-associative knowledge of biological things, ER displayed relatively preserved information about superordinate category as regards both categorical relations like "the owl is a bird" and attributes like "the owl has a wing" (for similar observations, cf. Forde et al., 1997; Sartori & Job, 1988; Tippett et al., 1995; . The categorical properties we used correspond to what Moss, Tyler, and colleagues call shared biological properties. Despite the fact that in the cued definition test ER presented a significant category effect when shared properties that do not pertain to biological function were considered (e.g., "can live in a zoo"), the result observed for biological shared properties is consistent with Moss, Tyler, and colleagues' claim Tyler et al., 2000) that, for biological objects, shared functional properties and their corresponding shared perceptual properties are strongly correlated, thus being mostly resistant to damage. However, ER's pattern of results can be accounted for by the fact that these properties reflect more familiar knowledge than other property types.
Intra-category variability
As indicated earlier, ER displayed not only a huge biological vs. nonbiological category effect but also a very strong frequency/typicality effect. Recognition of line drawings was better for typical items corresponding to frequent, early acquired words than for atypical items corresponding to rather rare, later acquired, words by about 70% and 10% among the living and nonliving categories, respectively. Likewise, word definition yielded word frequency/ typicality effects of about 60% and 30% in those categories. The apparently smaller word frequency/ typicality effect observed for nonliving items cannot be unambiguously interpreted, since the interaction is probably flawed by a ceiling effect for these items. The interesting point is that ER's impairment for semantic knowledge was much more marked on rare/atypical items than on frequent/typical ones. It thus seems that these variables strongly contribute to determine the activation level of semantic representations, even within the affected category.
Inter-category variability
Whatever the basis for intra-category variability, the present study has shown a striking dissociation between the category of living entities and the cate-gory of nonliving objects. However, the expression category-specific semantic impairment for living things must be considered as a shorthand "as not all the affected categories are living and not all living categories are affected" (Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, & Giustolisi, 1995, p. 256) . In fact, several studies have shown that in patients with a category-specific impairment for living things, food and, sometimes, musical instruments are also impaired, whereas body parts are often spared (e.g., Basso et al., 1988; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Forde et al., 1997; Sartori & Job, 1988; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Sirigu et al., 1991; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) .
ER, who was impaired in both structural and functional knowledge of living items, was severely affected in verbal colour knowledge of food items and in recognising these items from vision, but not in defining them verbally. This suggests that ER's deficit for food items might stem from an anomaly in activating knowledge from their images. However, this interpretation can hardly account for the qualitative nature of his naming errors on food items, which elicited many more misrecognitions and superordinate errors than the other biological subcategories.
The status of food items is far from clear: although manufactured, they are of biological origin. Their special status is thus not surprising (cf. Ross & Murphy, 1999 , for an experimental analysis of food subcategories). This is not the case of other object types, like musical instruments, which have also been reported as impaired in people showing a category-specific deficit for living things (cf. review in Gainotti, 2000) . Yet, in the present study we did not observe any impairment for musical instruments. ER performed as well on musical instruments as on other types of nonliving objects, this being true for visual recognition and for verbal (sensorial and associative/functional) knowledge.
Body parts and human items were also spared in ER, as they were in many other patients impaired for animals and/or fruits and vegetables. Conversely, body parts are often affected in cases showing a category-specific deficit for nonliving objects (e.g., Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 . In addition, Suzuki, Yamadori, and Fuji (1997) demonstrated a comprehension deficit limited to body parts. Why body parts are separated from other biological entities remains to be understood. Possible reasons are that body parts are lower in structural similarity than other natural categories (Price & Humphreys, 1989) and that their knowledge may depend strongly on proprioceptive and kinaesthetic features. Yet none of these ideas accounts for the fact that ER recognised not only body parts but also human items such as an old lady, a black boy, and a baby. His pattern of results thus seems more consistent with Shelton et al.'s (1998) suggestion that there is a separate network for conspecifics (see also Kay & Hanley, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) .
Recognition across modalities other than vision
The dissociation between living and nonliving things was observed whatever the modality of input (visual, verbal, nonverbal auditory) and whatever the content of the information (visual, associativefunctional, auditory). In particular, the specific impairment observed for nonverbal sound recognition undermines the explanatory power of an interpretation based on damage to structural descriptions. Whereas the notion of a structural description system common to the visual and tactile modalities has been proposed (Forde et al., 1997) , it seems implausible that a nonverbal sound recognition deficit results from damage to a system in which the spatial relations between the parts and the objects are specified.
Category specificity, richness of visual information, and contextual information
We examined whether the richness of visual information and the presence of contextual information helped the patient to overcome his difficulties. The answer to this question is disappointing from the point of view of rehabilitation, but theoretically interesting. ER did not benefit much from perceptual richness.
The fact that photographic details or the completeness of outline drawings did not help ER at all in recognising biological things is at odds with results observed in normal subjects. As a matter of fact, naming is facilitated in normal subjects by both colour and photographic detail, although the combined effect of these factors is not greater than either effect alone (Price & Humphreys, 1989) . In ER, the fact that colour knowledge was severely impaired for some items whose shape he still knew supports Price and Humphreys' suggestion that colour and shape are not part of an integrated representation of an object, although the separate representations of shape and colour may be interconnected.
Contextual information did not seem to help ER, either. Although we expected him to show better scores for animals interacting with each other and displaying their characteristic behaviour (movements, speed, special postures, screams, etc.) in their natural environment, the filmed material yielded an almost complete recognition failure. This incapacity to benefit from contextual cues adds to the evidence that ER suffered from a general impairment of knowledge for living things.
We further suggested that this response pattern could be a consequence of unstable activation of semantic knowledge. Indeed, ER did not only show a clear failure to benefit from context, but displayed even a slightly worse performance on the richer (filmed) stimuli, compared to static isolated animals. Unstable semantic activation might also account for the much more frequent choice, in the test of animal details knowledge, of the featureadded distractor (e.g., a crocodile with a horn) than of the part-erased (a crocodile without tail) and part-substituted (a crocodile with a mammal's tail) alternatives. As a matter of fact, in both the naming tests and the test on animal details, the more diverse items or item parts were presented, the more confusions occurred.
Unstable activation of semantic knowledge might perhaps also account for the confabulatorylike responses that ER presented in the word definition and cued definition tests. Fluent confabulation of incorrect semantic information in a patient with a category-specific deficit has already been reported by Laws et al. (1995) . Yet, as noticed by other authors (e.g., Sartori & Job, 1988) , we cannot decide whether the patients make such responses (e.g., to wonder, like ER, whether the turtle could have small wings) in order to fill missing information or whether a particular property (e.g., in the above example, wings) has actually been attached to the representation of the object (e.g., the turtle).
The notion of unstable semantic activation is not original. It has been put forward, for instance, by Newcombe and Marshall (1980) to account for semantic errors in deep dyslexia. A certain level of random noise within the semantic system (or within a specialised subpart of it) may lead to the elevation of the resting level of activation of some wrong representations, especially those that are related to the correct representation. We add to this notion the plausible assumption that presenting several items simultaneously would increase the probability of confusion.
Yet, the term "unstable" does not imply that the activation process is entirely random. The patient's errors are constrained by the categorical structure of the knowledge base. In almost all his recognition failures, ER respected the second-level superordinate category (i.e., animals were recognised as such), and in many cases he indicated the correct first-level superordinate category (e.g., the duck and the eagle were recognised as "birds").
Category specificity: Categorical organisation of knowledge? Caramazza and Shelton (1998) have recently reviewed converging evidence for the proposal that conceptual knowledge is organised categorically. One type of evidence comes from concept acquisition studies. Several studies seem to support the view that the concepts of animal and artefact are acquired through the operation of innate domainspecific mechanisms (e.g., Mandler, 1994; Spelke et al., 1995) .
ER's pattern of performance is consistent with the growing belief (Barbarotto et al., 2001; Caramazza, 1998; Kay & Hanley, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000; Shelton et al., 1998 ) that the categories of animals, plant life, conspecifics, and artefacts are dissociable. According to this taxonomic conception, there are separate subsystems of semantic representation for different categories, but there is no such separation for features: All conceptual information, both sensorial and nonsensorial, related to a particular category, is represented in the same neural network. Semantic category-specific deficits result from damage to one or several of the separate semantic networks. No reductionist model is able to account for such selective deficits, like, for example, one affecting only animals .
Nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, some aspects of ER's behaviour fit another model of semantic memory, which does not assume categorical organisation. The relative preservation of ER's knowledge of biological functional properties and their correlated visual characteristics shared by many members of the living category (like laying eggs, having legs, etc.) fits the intercorrelation model proposed by Moss et al. (1998; Tyler et al., 2000) . Should we then consider the intercorrelational model as a serious candidate to explain the patient's behaviour?
We believe that, based on the present set of results, this observation is not powerful enough to adopt the intercorrelational model as a first-order principle of semantic organisation. In fact, other aspects of our data contradict this model. First, when shared properties that do not pertain to biological function were considered, we did not observe a significant advantage of shared over distinctive properties for biological items. More crucially, ER showed worse knowledge of shared properties for biological items than for artefacts. This category effect was only observed on shared properties that do not pertain to biological function, because, since ER performed quite well on biological shared (highly familiar) properties, no room was left to reproduce such a category effect on biological shared properties, i.e., categorical attributes.
Assumptions about models of semantic knowledge
Whereas the present case study clearly supports the taxonomic model of the organisation of the semantic system, we ought to say that it does not provide any evidence against the assumptions put forward by feature-based models as regards the relation between categories and their features. In our view, these two issues, the relation between categories and features and how the semantic system is organised, have not often been considered in the literature as distinctly as they should have been (but see Shelton & Caramazza, 2001 , for a discussion). To illustrate this, we review here, quite schematically, the substance of non distributed feature-based models.
These models make two assumptions. Assumption 1 concerns the issue of organisation and states that the semantic system is arranged into two parts, one representing perceptual features and the other associative/functional features. Assumption 2 concerns the feature/category relation and states that there is a differential weight of sensorial and functional/associative features in living and nonliving things (Warrington & colleagues) .
From assumptions 1 and 2 it is legitimate to infer that category-specific deficits can occur. However, it would be a fallacy (of the type "affirming the consequent") to conclude that assumption 1 follows necessarily from observing both categoryspecific effects and evidence favouring assumption 2.
A taxonomic conception of the system organisation would remain viable even if the relation between the categories and their features were actually of the type proposed by Warrington and colleagues (or by distributed feature-based models like the one proposed by Moss & Tyler's group) . To say it somewhat differently, assumption 2, but of course not assumption 1, could go on together with the main assumption of the taxonomic view.
Note that we do not propose that there are two coexisting, causally equivalent, basic organisation principles, taxonomic and feature-based, respectively, possibly orthogonal to each other or arranged in a hierarchical way (Coltheart et al., 1998; Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Powell & Davidoff, 1995;  see also discussion in Samson et al., 1998) . Rather, according to our view, the organisation of the semantic system and the feature/category relation are different issues, the outcomes of which are quite independent. Thus, evidence for privileged relations between, e.g., perceptual features and living things or for some differential feature correlations for living vs. nonliving entities, does not imply that these features or correlations among features better describe semantic memory organisation than categories do. Conversely, evidence that entities are represented in a system organised by category rather than by features does not rule out the possibility that there might be a correlation between semantic features and semantic category, or that there might be some different privileged correlations for living vs. nonliving entities.
Not all models consider these issues. Unitary models, including distributed ones, disregard the organisation issue. The relation between features and categories is obviously ignored by those conceptions of semantic knowledge for which concepts are not sets of features but atomic representations (cf. a discussion of category-specific deficits according to the latter view in De Almeida, 1999).
In our opinion, a comprehensive view of semantic knowledge must incorporate both a theory of the structure of the system and a theory of the internal structure of concepts, as recently emphasised, e.g., by Shelton and Caramazza (2001) . ER's case, like many others reported in the literature, may be considered as a privileged way to tackle the semantic system organisation issue. As regards the category/ feature relation issue, we have been using fine-grain studies of normal individuals and found support for both differential weight and differential intercorrelation of sensorial and nonsensorial features in living and nonliving things (Ventura, Morais, Brito-Mendes, & Kolinsky, 2002 ). Yet, as we explain here, in our view this is not incompatible with the inference we make from the present case study, that there is a separate semantic system for living things or even, as indicated by the observation of selective deficits for say animals (e.g., ---------------------------------------- Data from Dubois (1982 Dubois ( , 1983 .
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